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At a press conference today, Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, MEP Markéta Gregorová and MEP and European Parliament Quaestor Marcel Kolaja presented twelve points from the Pirate Plan to combat disinformation, which they have already submitted to their coalition partners. The plan will be gradually promoted in the government, in the House of Commons and in the European Parliament. The main measures include, for example, strengthening the strategic communication of the authorities, education, cooperation with the public media, setting up a rapid and consistent monitoring and analysis of disinformation, as well as the enforcement of existing law in the online environment.
"Disinformation has become such a buzzword in recent years. In the public sphere, we face criticism that we as politicians are not doing enough against it. Or, on the contrary, that we provoke unnecessary moral panic. But disinformation is a real problem for our national and European security. Indeed, our Security Strategy, which we approved last year, also draws attention to this. The problem with disinformation arises when its massive dissemination contributes to the polarisation of society and incites hatred and violence. We must not underestimate the risks when the spread of disinformation threatens the security, foreign policy or economic interests of our country," said Jan Lipavský, adding that the Pirates take this issue very seriously. That is why, together with experts, they have prepared a twelve-point plan to face this challenge. Two of them have already been implemented.
"The Pirates have succeeded, for example, in getting disinformation websites cut off from public money thanks to a methodology from the Ministry for Regional Development, which is led by Pirate Minister and Chairman Ivan Bartos. Similarly, in 2022, we established a special Strategic Communication Department in my ministry, which is already cooperating with other ministerial departments and partners abroad," Lipavský described.
"Disinformation is a real threat, and according to the World Economic Forum it is one of the top five threats for the coming decade - indeed, it will be the biggest threat of all in the next two years. So if we are talking about security in Europe today, we have to talk about disinformation. And that they have perhaps never threatened democratic Europe more than now, on the eve of the first European elections since Putin's aggression began. Disinformation makes society uncomfortable, undermines citizens' trust in institutions, and helps to spread hatred and fear. And this in turn benefits populists and extremists - yet many still underestimate them, which we refuse to allow." was followed by Markéta Gregorová, who has long been working on hybrid threats and security in general at the European Parliament.
"We have also achieved a lot at the EU level - we have proposed measures in the areas of social networks, political advertising, transparent funding of news portals and support for independent media. And we intend to continue this work. But the most important thing is in the competence of nation states and for us Pirates it is absolutely crucial that we focus on education, support civil society and ensure a resilient state that can withstand the challenges of modern times and new and improving hybrid threats. As Pirates, we simply do not intend to leave democracy to the disinformers," added MEP and Quaestor of the European Parliament Marcel Kolaja.
The right not to be manipulated: twelve ways to combat misinformation
- Cutting off infosquatters from public money
Conspiracy and disinformation websites can no longer get public money. The Ministry of Regional Development, with the help of experts, has prepared procedures for media procurement that will prevent the placement of advertisements on dubious websites with manipulative or false content. - Strategic communication in key ministries
Key institutions are reflecting the need for strategic communication and are actively engaging in the fight against misinformation through the development of their own campaigns. In addition to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, we can mention in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Strategic Communication Department has been in place since 2022. This department works closely with other ministerial departments and with partners abroad. It has introduced its own procedures for combating disinformation and is gradually transferring the experience and know-how it has gained to other ministries. - Coordination of strategic communication
Alarmist messages and panic often stem from misinterpretation of public information provided by the state. This is due to 'resortism', lack of coordination and inconsistency in formulating responses to complex problems. The alpha and omega of strategic communication is for the line ministry to be able to provide relevant and verified information, to communicate that information to a mass audience, and to coordinate that communication across agencies. Strategic communication is already being addressed by some line ministries, including the MFA. We want to help to create more specialised departments in other ministries, coordinated by the Office of the Government. - Consistent monitoring and fast response
The cornerstone of an effective fight against misinformation is analytics, working with data and a well-set system for detecting serious manipulative content. Therefore, strategic communication must be based on a common methodology and procedures on how to evaluate this content, how and with whom to work to verify the information, and how to get this information to the widest possible audience as quickly as possible. - Evaluation of investments
It is not uncommon for the state to invest in education and information campaigns. Therefore, from the point of view of efficiency and transparency of spent funds, we emphasize a properly set system of their evaluation based on objective, measured criteria. This will help us to gradually improve the strategic communication system, learn from our own mistakes and deliver better results. - Enforcement of applicable law in the online environment
Covid and the war in Ukraine have contributed to further radicalisation of society. Alarmist messages and lies, slander, threats and other objectionable behaviour are increasingly appearing in the online space, which society is punishing through the criminal code. However, the latter is often toothless in the moments when one hides behind a keyboard. That is why we need an in-depth analysis of the current legal situation. In particular, a strong emphasis on transparency on the part of the producers of information or an interim measure that would protect victims of misinformation immediately and not only as a result of a protracted dispute could help. - Modern education:
Society is bombarded daily with visual propaganda, playing with numbers and graphs, the presentation of unverified information wrapped in argumentative fallacies and, more recently, the increasingly sophisticated capabilities of available digital technologies, including artificial intelligence tools. The key is to create the conditions to be able to respond flexibly to this, including in the field of education. Whether it is transforming educational content and teaching or setting up support for schools and teachers on how to work effectively with the topics. It is existentially important for the future of our society that young people enter independent life equipped with the knowledge and skills to handle, verify and evaluate information. A key step is to modernise and innovate the educational content and the actual teaching in the subjects already in place and to set up support for schools. - Supporting civil society:
The targets of anti-systemic and anti-democratic influence operations are often vulnerable groups of the population, such as senior citizens, residents of socially excluded localities, and members of national minorities. The state already supports in various forms organisations that are dedicated to the education of seniors or community activities in excluded localities. However, this support is not yet systematic and takes place episodically in individual projects. We need to change this so that the work builds on each other and forms a meaningful whole that can be evaluated and improved over time. - Resilient state:
Members of the armed forces and people working in strategic sectors of the state are natural targets of external influence operations by enemies to demoralise, spread panic or gain access to sensitive information. That is why we must first and foremost extend effective regular training to prepare people in strategic sectors with security implications for possible attacks. The state must take hybrid threats seriously and protect its key infrastructure. - Cooperation between the state and the public media:
In the wide range of public information available, it is crucial to support those media and organisations whose main motive is not profit, but quality journalistic work, and which take into account journalistic ethics, led by confirming and verifying sources. Public service media are prominent representatives that meet such standards. The latter are often more effective than the state in verifying information and enjoy greater public trust than politician-controlled ministries. This is because of their journalistic quality and independence (the Ověřovna project at Czech Radio is an example). The state can ask for fact-checking on critical topics from independent organisations, which can then distribute them further into the information space. - The right not to be manipulated:
The development of technologies such as artificial intelligence brings many opportunities, but also potential negative impacts on human rights and security. These technologies are also increasingly being misused in hybrid warfare, for example through the dissemination of 'deep fake' audiovisual content in the online space. Just as legislation protects us from misleading advertising or unfair commercial practices, citizens should be given a tool to defend themselves against manipulation in the digital environment. - Strengthening transparency
Nothing can convince a person of reality as much as seeing it with one's own eyes. In the past, we have witnessed many times a strained relationship between the public and the police, in which the lack of information about controversial interventions has played a major role. We therefore propose that the police should be obliged to record those interventions in which they use coercive means. In the event of a crisis communication, this footage can be used to provide a complete and unbiased illustration of reality. Many officers already do so voluntarily. Indeed, technology protects not only civil rights but also officers themselves from public anger fueled by incomplete information.
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