WASHINGTON - The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designates a subordinate organization of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Moscow branch of Russia's Main Intelligence Service (GRU) and its director under Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, which relates to interference in the U.S. election. As affiliates of the IRGC and GRU, these actors were intended to inflame socio-political tensions and influence U.S. voters during the 2024 U.S. elections. These measures build on sanctions previously imposed on the IRGC, GRU, and their numerous subordinate and intermediary organizations under several authorities targeting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and malicious cyber activity.
"The governments of Iran and Russia have targeted our electoral processes and institutions in an effort to divide the American people through targeted disinformation campaigns," said Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Bradley T. Smith. "The United States will remain vigilant against adversaries who would undermine our democracy."
Tehran's malign influence and interference in the elections
In the summer of 2024, a joint statement from the U.S. government announced that the Iranian government had sought to stir dissent and undermine confidence in the democratic institutions of the United States by using social engineering and other efforts to gain direct access to individuals with direct access to presidential campaigns of both parties. These activities, including the theft and disclosure of private information, are intended to influence the U.S. electoral process. As a follow-up to this announcement, on September 27, 2024, OFAC designated an Iranian national and member of the IRGC under E.O. 13848 for compromising several accounts of officials and advisors to the 2024 presidential campaign. OFAC also designated five employees of the Iranian cybersecurity company Emennet Pasargad, formerly known as Net Peygard Samavat Company, which OFAC designated in November 2021 under E.O. 13848 for attempting to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
IRGC subsidiary operations aimed at influencing
The Centre for Cognitive Design Production (CDPC) is a subsidiary of the IRGC. Since at least 2023, the CDPC has planned influence operations on behalf of the IRGC aimed at stoking socio-political tensions among US voters in the run-up to the 2024 US elections.
OFAC designates CDPC under E.O. 13848 because it is owned or controlled by IRGC, a person whose property and interests are blocked under E.O. 13848, or has directly or indirectly acted or purported to act for or on behalf of IRGC.
Moscow's malign influence and election meddling
The Government of the Russian Federation uses a variety of tools, including covert foreign malign influence campaigns and illicit cyber activities, to undermine the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and its allies and partners around the world. Moscow also routinely uses its intelligence services, government-controlled proxies, and covert tools of influence in these efforts. The Kremlin has increasingly tailored its efforts to conceal its involvement by creating a vast ecosystem of Russian proxy websites, fake online personas, and front organizations that create the false appearance of independent intelligence sources with no ties to the Russian state.
These designations build on previous OFAC actions that have highlighted and disrupted global Russian malign influence campaigns, including RT, RaHDit, RRN, and Doppelgänger influence operations, Kremlin-led malign influence efforts, interference in U.S. elections, efforts to subvert democracy in Moldova, destabilization activities in Ukraine, and the operation of channels controlled by Russian intelligence services.
GRU-linked entity uses AI tools to interfere in 2024 US election
A Moscow-based entity, the Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE), founded by OFAC-listed Alexander Dugin, directs and subsidizes the creation and publication of deepfakes and the dissemination of disinformation about candidates in the 2024 U.S. general election. CGE personnel work directly with a GRU unit that oversees sabotage, political interference operations, and cyberwarfare aimed at the West. Since at least 2024, a GRU officer and CGE member has directed CGE Director Valery Mikhailovich Korovin and other CGE personnel to conduct various influence operations aimed at the 2024 U.S. presidential election.
At the direction and with the financial support of the GRU, CGE and its staff used generative artificial intelligence tools to rapidly create disinformation to be disseminated on a vast network of websites designed to mimic legitimate news outlets, creating false correlations between reports and obscuring their Russian origin. CGE created a server to host the AI generative tools and related AI-generated content to avoid foreign web hosting services blocking their activities. GRU provided financial support to CGE and a network of U.S.-based intermediaries to: build and maintain the AI-enabled server; maintain a network of at least 100 websites used in disinformation operations; and contribute to the cost of renting the apartment where the server is located. Korovin played a key role in coordinating financial support from the GRU for its US-based employees and intermediaries.
In addition to using generative artificial intelligence to construct and disseminate disinformation aimed at U.S. voters in the run-up to the 2024 U.S. general election, CGE also manipulated a video it used to create unsubstantiated allegations about the 2024 vice presidential candidate in an effort to sow discord among U.S. voters.
OFAC designates CGE and Korovin under Executive Order 13848 as having directly or indirectly participated in, sponsored, concealed, or otherwise engaged in foreign malign influence in the 2024 U.S. election. In addition, OFAC is designating CGE under E.O. 13694, as amended, E.O. 14024, and Section 224 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) because it is owned or controlled by GRU, a person whose assets and holdings are blocked under E.O. 13694.O. 13694, as amended, E.O. 14024, and Section 224 of CAATSA, or has directly or indirectly acted or attempted to act for or on behalf of the GRU. OFAC also designates Korovin under E.O. 14024 as a person who is or was a director, officer, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of CGE, i.e., a person whose property and interests in property are blocked under E.O. 14024.
https://twitter.com/tassagency_en/status/1874161722455368117
Blacklisted by the USA Judge Olesya Mendeleyeva was also included under the "Magnitsky Act". As it is stated in the Ministry's explanation, Mendeleyeva was sanctioned "for his role in the arbitrary detention of Moscow councillor and human rights defender Alexei Gorinov". In July 2022, he was sentenced to seven years in prison in a case of discrediting the Russian army. According to the case file, Gorinov declared at a meeting of city councilors on March 15, 2022, that the recreation of Muscovites was unacceptable because military operations were underway on the territory of a neighboring sovereign state. Gorinov pleaded not guilty and became the first person convicted in the Russian Federation to receive a real prison sentence under the article. In 2024, the court increased the former MP's sentence by three years for justifying terrorism.
Consequences of sanctions
As a result of the measures, all property and interests in property of the above designated persons located in the United States or held or controlled by U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, all entities that are owned directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, of 50 % or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or special license issued by OFAC, or exempted from OFAC's jurisdiction, OFAC regulations generally prohibit all transactions by or within (or in transit through) the United States involving any property or ownership interests of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
In addition, financial institutions and other persons who engage in certain transactions or activities with sanctioned persons may be subject to sanctions or enforcement proceedings. Prohibitions include the making of any contributions or the provision of funds, goods or services by or to a designated person or the receipt of any contributions or the provision of funds, goods or services from such a person.
Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to intentionally or unintentionally violate U.S. sanctions, as well as from engaging in conduct that circumvents U.S. sanctions. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidance provides more information on OFAC's enforcement of U.S. sanctions, including the factors OFAC generally considers in determining the appropriate response to an apparent violation.
The strength and integrity of OFAC's sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add individuals to the SDN list, but also from its willingness to remove individuals from the SDN list in accordance with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to achieve positive behavioral change.
For more information about the people who have been added to the list today, please see here.
U.S. Department of the Treasury/ gnews - RoZ
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