Europe must realise that its own security and that of Ukraine cannot be achieved by a confrontational strategy aimed at isolating Russia, deepening the war and consolidating the hostility between the EU and Russia. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship between the European Union and Russia has been marked by missed opportunities, mistrust and strategic mistakes. In recent years, this fragile relationship has been pushed towards a military confrontation in Ukraine. The ongoing war in Ukraine - devastating in its human, economic and geopolitical toll - has dramatically and dangerously deepened the rift between Russia and the European Union. For this reason, there is an urgent need to reassess how Europe understands Russia's motives and how it should deal with its neighbour.
The prevailing European narrative of unprovoked Russian aggression in Ukraine is historically superficial to the point of triviality and strategically dangerous. A more detailed understanding of Russia's historical security concerns, an acknowledgement of Western provocations after 1991 and a return to diplomacy, Ukraine's neutrality and the principles of collective security rooted in post-war European institutions are essential. My proposals are not about appeasement; they are about building the foundations for lasting peace in Europe and security in Ukraine.
Russia's strategic position: defence, not conquest of the West
To understand how Europe should engage with Russia, we need to start by taking a fresh look at how Russia perceives itself and its security. For centuries, Russia's geopolitical behavior has been shaped less by Russia's alleged expansionism toward the West than by Russia's fear of invasion from the West. Russia also does not succumb to paranoia in its fear of the West; it merely reflects on its long history. Russia has been repeatedly invaded by the West, with disastrous consequences for Russia. The Polish-Lithuanian invasion of Russia during the Time of Sorrow in the early 17th century; the Swedish invasion of Russia in the early 18th century; Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812; and, of course, Nazi Germany's invasion of Russia in 1941, all left deep scars in Russia's collective memory. These were not minor border skirmishes, but existential threats that led to enormous loss of Russian life and profound material devastation.
Even the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe after the Second World War, though undoubtedly repressive, was not born of Soviet or Russian imperialism. At its core, it was a security strategy motivated by the trauma of Hitler's invasion, which cost 27 million Soviet lives, and the unilateral decision of the US and its allies to rearm West Germany from the late 1940s onwards. The U.S. rearmament of West Germany reinforced Moscow's determination to maintain a military buffer zone between West Germany and the Soviet Union.
For centuries, Russia's geopolitical behavior has been shaped less by its alleged westward expansionism than by its fear of invasion from the West.
Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union sought to end the threat of German rearmament by urging the US to agree to a neutral, demilitarized and reunified Germany. Stalin went in this direction in 1952 (in his famous Stalin Notes) and Khrushchev tried again in 1955, using the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Austria as a model of neutrality that could be applied to Germany. Specifically, the Soviet Union withdrew its occupation troops from Austria in 1955 based on Austria's declaration of neutrality and its permanent non-membership in NATO. The Soviet Union hoped to use the Austrian example as an incentive for the United States to apply the same approach to Germany. The great American diplomat George Kennan strongly supported a strategy of peace with the Soviet Union achieved through German neutrality and disarmament, but the U.S. government firmly rejected the Soviet initiative and instead incorporated a remilitarized West Germany into NATO in 1955.
In today's context, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should be understood through this historical lens. It is essential to ask why Russia invaded Ukraine - and whether the invasion could have been prevented. The answer that lies in plain sight is that the Russian invasion in February 2022 was provoked by 30 years of aggressive US policy towards Russia, since the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This aggressive US policy has been coupled with a totally dismissive US attitude to Russia's security concerns.
The war in February 2022 could have been avoided at many points. The US could have chosen not to support the violent coup in February 2014 against Ukraine's pro-Russian president. The US could have pressured Ukraine to enforce the Minsk II agreement. The U.S. could have chosen to negotiate with Russia in December 2021, when President Putin put forward a draft Russian-U.S. Security Guarantee Agreement.
In the first weeks after the invasion, the war could have ended in April 2022 as part of the so-called Istanbul Process. After all, the Russian invasion was not aimed at conquering Ukraine, but rather at forcing Ukraine to accept neutrality and renounce its membership in NATO.
The Road to War in Ukraine: Western Expansion and the Erosion of Trust
The war in Ukraine is not the result of an unprovoked Russian invasion, as is so often claimed, but the culmination of decades of Western, especially American, interference in what Russia perceives as its security zone. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian leaders - especially those associated with reform and democracy - hoped for a new security architecture that included Russia as a partner. Despite today's denials, the U.S. and Germany explicitly and repeatedly promised Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the NATO alliance would not move "an inch east" and that, more generally, the West would not exploit the relative weakness of the Soviet Union and Russia in the context of German reunification in 1990.
It turned out to be Western lies.
As early as 1992, the White House began planning for NATO expansion. In 1994, the Clinton administration agreed on a long-term plan for NATO expansion that was in stark contrast to the promises made just a few years earlier. In the late 1990s, NATO began to expand eastward, first to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and then in 2004 to include the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia. So much for "not an inch east".
As early as the mid-1990s, the US was already planning to expand NATO not only into Central and Eastern Europe, but into the South Caucasus, including Georgia. The plan was to encircle Russia in the Black Sea area, and thus encircle the Russian warm-water naval fleet, which has been based in Sevastopol in Crimea since 1783. It was a game plan that followed the plan of Lord Palmerston and Napoleon III in the Crimean War (1953-6).
Zbigniew Brzezinski (political scientist and expert on US international policy, advisor to Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama) wrote about this strategy in 1997, both in his book The Grand Chessboard and in a remarkable article for Foreign Affairs on "Geostrategy for Eurasia". Brzezinski realized that Russia would recoil from such a plan because it was precisely designed by the US to encircle and weaken Russia. Some members of the U.S. deep state also spoke of "decolonizing Russia" or breaking Russia into pieces. Brzezinski believed that Russia should be pushed to become a weak confederation of three largely autonomous parts: European Russia, Siberian Russia, and Far Eastern Russia.
For centuries, Russia's geopolitical behavior has been shaped less by its alleged westward expansionism than by its fear of invasion from the West.
Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union sought to end the threat of German rearmament by urging the US to agree to a neutral, demilitarized and reunified Germany. Stalin went in this direction in 1952 (in his famous Stalin Notes) and Khrushchev tried again in 1955, using the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Austria as a model of neutrality that could be applied to Germany. Specifically, the Soviet Union withdrew its occupation troops from Austria in 1955 based on Austria's declaration of neutrality and its permanent non-membership in NATO. The Soviet Union hoped to use the Austrian example as an incentive for the United States to apply the same approach to Germany. The great American diplomat George Kennan strongly supported a strategy of peace with the Soviet Union achieved through German neutrality and disarmament, but the U.S. government firmly rejected the Soviet initiative and instead incorporated a remilitarized West Germany into NATO in 1955.
In today's context, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should be understood through this historical lens. It is essential to ask why Russia invaded Ukraine - and whether the invasion could have been prevented. The answer that lies in plain sight is that the Russian invasion in February 2022 was provoked by 30 years of aggressive US policy towards Russia, since the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This aggressive US policy has been coupled with a totally dismissive US attitude to Russia's security concerns.
The war in February 2022 could have been avoided at many points. The US could have chosen not to support the violent coup in February 2014 against Ukraine's pro-Russian president. The US could have pressured Ukraine to enforce the Minsk II agreement. The U.S. could have chosen to negotiate with Russia in December 2021, when President Putin put forward a draft Russian-U.S. Security Guarantee Agreement.
In the weeks after the invasion, the war could have been ended in April 2022 as part of the so-called Istanbul Process. After all, the Russian invasion was not aimed at conquering Ukraine, but rather at forcing Ukraine to accept neutrality and renounce its membership in NATO.
The Road to War in Ukraine: Western Expansion and the Erosion of Trust
The war in Ukraine is not the result of an unprovoked Russian invasion, as is so often claimed, but the culmination of decades of Western, especially American, interference in what Russia perceives as its security zone. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian leaders - especially those associated with reform and democracy - hoped for a new security architecture that included Russia as a partner. Despite today's denials, the U.S. and Germany explicitly and repeatedly promised Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the NATO alliance would not move "an inch east" and that, more generally, the West would not exploit the relative weakness of the Soviet Union and Russia in the context of German reunification in 1990. These turned out to be Western lies.
As early as 1992, the White House began planning for NATO expansion. In 1994, the Clinton administration agreed on a long-term plan for NATO expansion that was in stark contrast to the promises made just a few years earlier. In the late 1990s, NATO began to expand eastward, first to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and then in 2004 to include the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia. So much for "not an inch east".
As early as the mid-1990s, the US was already planning to expand NATO not only into Central and Eastern Europe, but into the South Caucasus, including Georgia. The plan was to encircle Russia in the Black Sea area, and thus encircle the Russian warm-water naval fleet, which has been based in Sevastopol in Crimea since 1783. It was a game plan that followed the plan of Lord Palmerston and Napoleon III in the Crimean War (1953-6).
Zbigniew Brzezinski (political scientist and expert on US international policy, advisor to Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama) wrote about this strategy in 1997, both in his book The Grand Chessboard and in a remarkable article for Foreign Affairs on "Geostrategy for Eurasia". Brzezinski realized that Russia would recoil from such a plan because it was precisely designed by the US to encircle and weaken Russia. Some members of the U.S. deep state also spoke of "decolonizing Russia" or breaking Russia into pieces. Brzezinski believed that Russia should be pushed to become a weak confederation of three largely autonomous parts: European Russia, Siberian Russia, and Far Eastern Russia.
Some in the American deep state have also talked about dividing Russia into pieces: European Russia, Siberian Russia, and the Far East.
Brezinski elaborated on how Russia would respond to such an aggressive strategy by the US, Europe and NATO. His response was straightforward and reminiscent of US arrogance in the 1990s. He confidently predicted that Russia would bow to a superior Western power. He explained it this way: 'Russia's only real geostrategic option - the option that could give Russia a realistic international role while maximising the opportunity for transformation and social modernisation - is Europe. And not just any Europe, but a transatlantic Europe of an expanding EU and NATO. Such a Europe is taking shape... and is likely to remain closely tied to America. This is the Europe with which Russia will have to identify if it is to avoid dangerous geopolitical isolation."
This prediction by Brzezinski illustrates a fundamental strategic error by the West: that it could threaten Russia, expand military bases towards Russia, overthrow governments near Russia in color revolutions, and even seek to dismantle Russia, and that Russia will do nothing but meekly submit to a superior Western power.
NATO's fatal step too far in 2008
2008 marked a decisive step when the NATO summit in Bucharest declared that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO". Although NATO set no timetable, the Bucharest NATO declaration was taken as a serious provocation in Moscow. The 2014 Maidan uprising that toppled democratically elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych with the active support of Western governments was another defining moment. From Moscow's point of view, which I agree with on the basis of extensive evidence, this was not a popular revolution, but a Western-backed violent coup that decisively turned Ukraine against Russia. Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in the Donbas followed shortly afterwards. After the coup, the Kiev regime talked about pushing the Russian navy out of Crimea. Russia acted to prevent Crimea from falling into NATO hands.
While Russia's actions in Crimea and the Donbas have been widely condemned in the West as Russian aggression, in reality they have directly resulted from the US and EU's role in destabilising the region through their support for regime change and their brazen dismissal of Russian security concerns. The Minsk II agreement, brokered by Russia, France and Germany and signed in 2015 with the unanimous support of the UN Security Council, was ostensibly intended to resolve the conflict in the Donbas through negotiated autonomy for ethnically Russian regions. However, Ukraine, again with Western support, has brazenly refused to implement the agreement. Meanwhile, the US and Europe continued to build up the Ukrainian army to become the largest army in Europe. By 2022, Russia was convinced that Ukraine was essentially a NATO forward base, equipped with advanced Western weapons and openly hostile to Moscow. The invasion that followed was born of a perceived encirclement - not an imperial ambition to restore the Soviet Union, as some Western leaders claimed.
Sabotage of the Istanbul peace process between the US and the UK
In April 2022, Russia and Ukraine were on the verge of signing a peace agreement in Istanbul, with the Turkish government acting as a mediator. The US and the UK dissuaded Ukraine from signing the agreement and since then hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have died or been seriously injured. However, the framework of the Istanbul process still provides the basis for peace today.
The draft peace agreement (of 15 April 2022) and the Istanbul Communiqué (of 29 March 2022) on which it was based offered a reasonable and straightforward way to end the conflict. Moreover, three years after Ukraine unilaterally broke off negotiations during which it suffered heavy losses, Ukraine will end up losing more territory than it would have lost in April 2022 - and yet it may still gain the essentials: sovereignty, international security agreements and peace.
There have been no meaningful high-level diplomatic contacts between the EU and Russia for more than three years. This silence is not only irresponsible, but also dangerous.
In the 2022 negotiations, they agreed on Ukraine's permanent neutrality and international security guarantees for Ukraine. The final arrangement of the disputed territories was to be decided over time through negotiations between the parties, during which both sides pledged to refrain from the use of force to change borders. The exact structure of the security arrangements was still to be negotiated.
With the draft agreement almost complete by April 15, the US intervened to stop the process. The US and UK told Ukraine to reject neutrality and fight on. The US pledged its full support "for as long as necessary". Ukraine withdrew from the talks and later ruled out even the possibility of resuming negotiations. Since then, Ukraine has lost perhaps a million or more soldiers who have been fatally or seriously wounded, while losing more territory.
The silence of diplomacy: Europe's missed opportunity
Perhaps the worst indictment of Western policy since 2022 is the almost complete absence of diplomacy. There has been no meaningful high-level diplomatic contact between the EU and Russia for more than three years. This silence is not only irresponsible - it is dangerous.
Diplomacy does not require moral equivalence. It requires realism, pragmatism and the recognition that lasting peace is only possible through dialogue. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, American and Soviet leaders maintained secret channels and negotiated arms control treaties. This spirit of engagement - embodied by the Helsinki Accords and the creation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - is absent today. Europe, which would bear the brunt of any escalation, stands to benefit most from a revival of diplomacy. It must assert its independent interests and facilitate talks aimed at laying the foundations for a negotiated settlement. Given that the war in Ukraine has no military solution, continued fighting will increase the costs for Ukrainians, Russians and Europeans.
The road to peace: Neutrality, Arms Control and Collective Security
Europe should support the five-part framework for lasting peace.
First, a commitment that NATO will not expand into Ukraine. This would not mean capitulation to Russian demands, but rather a recognition of the geopolitical reality that was obvious from the start. Ukraine's membership of NATO is not necessary for its sovereignty or security. On the contrary, it has become a red line that has pushed the country into a war of attrition with Russia. A neutral Ukraine - like Austria during the Cold War - could still pursue EU integration, democratic governance and economic development without becoming a pawn or a victim of great power competition.
Second, Ukraine should accept neutral status as part of a broader security guarantee. Neutrality does not mean weakness; it can be combined with security guarantees and international oversight. Such a status would reassure Russia while respecting Ukraine's independence. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of a neutral Ukraine should be protected by an international agreement adopted by the UN Security Council.
Third, as painful as it will be, Russia will suffer some territorial loss. Europe claims to oppose any territorial changes by force, but in fact most of Europe has recognised Kosovo, which was forcibly separated from Serbia by NATO during the 78-day bombing campaign in 1999. The division of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan is another recent example of a border change promoted by the United States. The U.S. and Europe could have spared Ukraine any loss of territory - had the U.S. and Europe not conspired to overthrow the Ukrainian government in February 2014. Similarly, the loss of the Donbas could have been entirely avoided had the U.S. and EU insisted that Ukraine comply with the Minsk II agreement.
The alternative to diplomacy at this stage is not victory over Russia, but doom for Ukraine and perhaps the world if there is an escalation to nuclear war.
Fourth, the United States and Russia must return to nuclear arms control. The unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, and the suspension of the New START Treaty and its imminent expiry in 2026, have put the world in a precarious situation. The risk of accidental escalation or miscalculation is growing, especially in an unstable environment such as Eastern Europe. Europe should press Washington and Moscow to resume negotiations on nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
Fifth, the principle of collective security in Europe must be restored. The OSCE, which was born out of the Helsinki process, was built on the idea that peace in Europe requires cooperation, not confrontation. Its aim was to create a pan-European security space where all countries - regardless of their alliances - had a voice and a stake. This vision must be revived.
The moral and strategic imperative of peace
The approach I recommend is often dismissed by critics as naive or too conciliatory. Yet it is rooted in the hard lessons of history and the pressing dangers of the present. Europe cannot afford to sleepwalk into a wider war. Nor can it continue to outsource its security and strategic posturing to Washington, whose interests do not always coincide with those of the European continent.
The moral imperative is also clear. The war in Ukraine has killed hundreds of thousands of people, displaced millions and destroyed infrastructure on a massive scale. It increases every month. Ukraine's reconstruction will take decades and hundreds of billions of dollars and cannot begin in earnest until the fighting is over. Moreover, the war has deepened the division of the world into hostile blocs, weakened global cooperation on climate change and development, and caused economic disruption that has disproportionately affected the global South. Peace in Ukraine is not just a regional problem; it is a global priority.
A call for renewed European diplomatic leadership
Europe now faces a choice. It can pursue a confrontational strategy aimed at isolating Russia, deepening the war and entrenching the hostility between the EU and Russia. Or it can take the initiative and chart a new path to peace. This would require vision, courage and a willingness to break away from the dominant narrative.
The first step is to reframe the debate. Peace is not weakness. Diplomacy is not appeasement. Neutrality is not abandonment. These are the tools for building a sustainable and inclusive security order. Europe should also be united in urging Washington to prioritise arms control and diplomacy, not more war.
Europe should reinvest in collective security institutions and diplomacy. The OSCE should be revitalised. Ukraine's future should not be secured by war, but by neutrality, reconstruction and integration into a peaceful and prosperous European order.
Peace also does not mean frozen conflict. Instead, Europe must realise that its own security and that of Ukraine cannot be achieved by confrontation, exclusion or military escalation against Russia. European security must be built through diplomacy, compromise and the revival of a collective security framework that recognises the national security interests of all actors - including Russia.
The war in Ukraine has no winners, let alone Ukraine. But there is still time to avoid total disaster. Europe should return to diplomacy and take up the difficult but necessary work of peacemaking. The alternative to diplomacy at this stage is not victory over Russia, but doom for Ukraine and perhaps for the world if there is an escalation to nuclear war. Europe must act not in anger or fear, but in pursuit of a future where cooperation across the continent replaces conflict and where peace is once again possible.
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