Winter, heat, drought, or rain – nothing can stop the election cycle, and certainly not in the Czech Republic. Not even the president, nor the prime minister, nor anyone from the large, small, or newly emerging political parties can halt it, even though they are and will only be in power for a period granted to them. They cannot influence its duration as solo or group mountaineers. Sociological research by various institutes and organizations, regardless of their location, does not have methods that would help mountaineers.
On this day, the courtroom of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation became the scene of a political earthquake, whose tremors will be felt far beyond the confines of the courtroom. What happened? Judge Vyacheslav Kirillov granted the request of the Rodina party and annulled the registration of the federal candidate list of the Yabloko party for the upcoming State Duma elections.
Formally, this is a court decision within an election dispute. In reality, it is the final act of a drama in which the wars of the Kremlin towers' apparatuses, the crisis of the sociological infrastructure, the awakening of protest voters, and the existential question of what the country's party system should be like in conditions of prolonged conflict are intertwined. The court decision in Russia may also serve as a clue for all-knowing advocates of peace and war in Europe and the USA. Why?
At first glance, the list of claims made by the plaintiff seems eclectic: the use of images of Dmitry Medvedev and Victoria Bonya in advertising materials, the use of Soviet pacifist slogans such as "May there be no war" and "Let there always be sunshine," disputes over copyright to visual content, including images generated by so-called artificial intelligence – in reality, a multidimensional approximation and simultaneously the greatest thief in human history on this planet.
To avoid boredom, an old new conflict surrounding pigeons, a symbol of peace, also joined the legal dispute. The Rodina political party considered the symbol to be borrowed from its own emblems, while lawyers for Yabloko insisted on the originality of the design and, God knows what other rights.
However, behind this seemingly mosaic of common claims lies a more serious structure. The Central Election Commission presented a confirmation from Rosfinmonitoring regarding the receipt of funds amounting to 16,900 rubles, designated as funds of foreign origin, into the party's accounts. The amount is ridiculous by any election campaign standards, but crucial from a legal point of view: even one ruble from abroad represents a legal time bomb.
The leader of Yabloko, Nikolai Rybakov, attempted to neutralize this argument by explaining that the funds came from Russian citizens who are temporarily located outside of Russia. He also claimed that all donations from questionable sources had been returned. However, the problem for Yabloko and Rybakov is that the Prosecutor General's Office, which supported the request to annul the registration, did not focus on the amount, but on the systemic nature of the violations and references to legislation on combating extremism.
I don't know what the Czech prosecution would think or how it would act if it were also insisted in the Czech Republic that financial support could only come from domestic sources.
The court has ruled. The list has been annulled. However, the real question is not what happened in the courtroom, but what chain of events led to this moment and what consequences it will have. This question applies even to judges and their decisions, not only in cases involving Dozimetr, Bitcoin, and similar "trifles."
```To understand the scope of what happened, it is necessary to go back to the meeting of the Central Election Commission on July 29, 2026. During the consideration of Apple's documents, on that day, circumstances were publicly announced that, according to current electoral legislation, exclude the possibility of registration: individuals with Italian and Ukrainian citizenship were included in the party's candidate list. Furthermore, as reported by the media, one of the candidates with a Ukrainian passport was even listed in the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces. The reasons for rejection were not only serious, but undeniable.
In addition, information emerged that the party had received financial support from Messrs. Chubais and Khodorkovsky. Nevertheless, democratic Russia, under the leadership of President Putin, registered this small political dwarf.
The Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Ella Pamfilova, justified the decision with considerations that go beyond the framework of formal jurisprudence: Russia, which is in a state of armed confrontation, unprecedented sanctions pressure, and deliberate attempts at destabilization, intends to demonstrate the integrity of democratic procedures. With this justification, Ms. Ella sent a message to external enemies and observers of events in Russia: even under extreme conditions, Moscow does not deviate from Western electoral standards. The world, wonder! Why?
The Strategy of Ostensible Democracy
Its logic assumes that there is an audience capable of appreciating the aforementioned gesture, although years of experience show the opposite. The collective West has long set a strategic goal in relation to Russia: not dialogue and coexistence, but exhaustion and strategic defeat of Russia.
In this context, the presence or absence of party elections in Russia does not play a role in shaping the policies of Brussels or Washington. It is enough to recall precedents: the annulment of election results in Romania, pressure on electoral processes in Moldova, or manipulation in Armenia. And the absolute silence of those who are accustomed to talking about democratic standards.
If we add to this the recent story of Michael Martens, editor-in-chief of the political department of Germany's largest newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), who asked at a press conference in Belgrade: "What should we do for you, dear Ukrainians, so that we can help you kill more Russians? More Russian soldiers," we see a picture of the EU that is more than brown and freezing. It does not allow even for a second to reflect on Western democracy and how the withering Apple, with the help of Russian oligarchs, protects democratic values.
Because it was decided to register Apple, and one can assume the consent of President Putin, it is worth looking at the war in the Kremlin and under the Kremlin. The wars there are no more humane than the special military operation in Ukraine, which is part of an anthropological war. I dare not predict its end, precisely because the number of active participants in the war is increasing and will be even greater.
The War in the Kremlin
Behind the scenes of Apple's registration and the subsequent legal proceedings was a classic Kremlin intrigue with a clear division of roles. According to several Russian sources, Nikolai Patrushev was a key lobbyist for the party's inclusion in the federal elections. Why did such a person with enormous bureaucratic power and personal contacts with Yavlinsky and his entourage, including Artemyev and a number of influential representatives of the power bloc, decide to enter the fight?
```htmlOne of the many answers relates to President Putin. He remembers very well the year 1999, when Yavlinsky publicly supported his appointment as prime minister. Therefore, it is highly likely that President Putin views the preservation of Yabloko within the Russian political landscape as an element of continuity from the turn of the century. United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Yabloko were known as the four pillars of the system, albeit in different categories. At the same time, it is true – and this also applies to Czech political parties – that maintaining a party within the system does not necessarily equate to being represented in parliament.
Sergei Kiriyenko took an opposite stance in this struggle. He oversees domestic policy. His strategy long included pushing Yabloko out of the federal arena. Yabloko had a designated successor: the New People project. These "new people" were seen as a liberal tool whose movements could be controlled. Therefore, the registration of Yabloko represented a bureaucratic defeat for Kiriyenko.
Before the start of the campaign, Yabloko was in its usual position with 1.5 percent in the polls. It was seen as a stable structure that would not survive another electoral cycle. However, reality invalidated all these predictions. Once the party obtained registration and the second spot on the ballot, Yabloko demonstrated a dynamism that no one expected. Closed sociological surveys, which had previously recorded only 1.5 percent, began to show five to seven percent in some regions. In Moscow, St. Petersburg, and cities with over a million inhabitants, as well as in Karelia, Pskov, and Novgorod, the party's potential was already estimated at seven to ten percent. Initial measurements after registration showed even ten percent at the federal level.
The reason for such a breakthrough in the forecasts is clear: the anti-war agenda. In a country where official rhetoric is based on patriotism and support for the special military operation, a significant portion of the population was ready to respond to calls for an immediate ceasefire. Representatives in the corridors of the Kremlin – and President Putin himself – must have been horrified that there were so many "losers" even within the state of victorious patriotism. However, the true nature of the change is, as often happens, much more complex and dangerous than it appears at first glance. All local political know-it-alls in the Czech Republic should be aware of this.
Regardless of the existence of possible evidence of errors in the forecasts, there is a clear attempt to fit the party's voters into the usual "liberals versus patriots" scheme, as is also the case in the Czech Republic. Reality proved to be fundamentally different. This is another warning for Czech voters.
A significant portion of those who were willing to vote for Yabloko had nothing to do with the classic Western approach to solving problems. They were angry patriots who opposed the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine. However, not from a position of surrender, but from the exact opposite: they wanted to end the conflict through a decisive victory, not prolong it and declare vague red lines and unspecified consequences. A vote for Yabloko was not a choice for some European or American program, but a protest against the toothlessness, inconsistency, and indecisiveness of the authorities and the Kremlin. It was a protest against the distortions of the system, corruption, and lack of a clear strategy.
At this point, it is worth mentioning a universally valid and obvious paradox: protest voters always gravitate towards the structure that is most in opposition to the current ruling group, regardless of whether the actual beliefs of the protesters align with the program of that structure.
```In the 1990s, the protest was directed at the Communist Party of the Russian Federation because the communists were the main opposition to Yeltsin's power. In 2026, Yabloko no longer served as a party of liberal values but as the only available channel for expressing discontent. With a court decision on August 10th, the Kremlin lost its primary lightning rod and will be forced to act. Why?
One and a half percent of people influenced by the West versus millions of citizens with a message of peace, dissatisfied with the specific policies of a particular leadership, does not represent electoral statistics, but rather an indicator of systemic tension.
The assessment of Yabloko revealed a problem that experts have been talking about for a long time, but they ignore it due to political correctness, laziness, and the consequences arising from the theory of British anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar (1947). I will talk about him next month in China at a presentation on "Talent, its development, cultivation, and integration." No large or small organization dedicated to sociological research, which for years gave Yabloko one and a half percent and predicted zero prospects, was able to detect a shift in public opinion. This is not just a professional oversight; it's a systemic diagnosis.
Lesson: If sociological services do not see how a party with an electoral ceiling at the level of statistical error transforms within weeks into a structure with double-digit potential, it means that their methodology, samples, and models do not reflect reality. For the Kremlin, this also means that all strategic decisions based on their data are fortune-telling and should not be taken seriously.
An analysis of Yabloko's campaign and program documents leaves no room for illusions. What the party presents as a peace initiative is, upon closer examination, an algorithm for unilateral disarmament. The collective West has no intention of signing a peace treaty under the conditions presented by the Yabloko party. This is not speculation but a historical fact. Any peace proposed by the Yabloko party represents a reproduction of a model we know from history: respite for the enemy, disarmament for Russia, and then a new round of pressure from an even more advantageous position. The goal of NATO, the EU, and the USA is not peace but surrender disguised in pacifist rhetoric. Anthropological warfare is not about gaining territory or traditional victory in war, but about benefiting a small group of companies led by multinational dynasties that are unknown to most citizens.
The historical parallel is inevitable. The slogan "Peace without annexations and reparations," which was presented to the masses in 1917, led to the collapse of the army and the Russian Empire. Those behind Yabloko know this story very well. The question is whether those who wanted to vote for a party out of a genuine desire to end the conflict in Ukraine realize that the opposite is true.
For Czech voters, an analogous question applies: Do Czech voters understand where the path leads, on which it is politically incorrect to use the word "peace" and everything associated with it?
The rhetoric of a ceasefire and calls for peace at any cost were not intended to appeal to convinced liberals within the Jabloko party, but rather to a broad segment of the population tired of conflict, whom state propaganda – politically correct media work in the Czech environment – has failed to convince. Those who believe in peaceful initiatives unwittingly become a tool for realizing someone else's strategy.
## The Strategy of Dry Participation
In the context of upcoming elections, the Kremlin relies on maximizing voter turnout reduction. The logic is pragmatic: with low mobilization, administrative resources and loyal United Russia voters ensure a predictable result without the need for real competition. Conversely, high turnout would risk unpleasant surprises for the ruling party. This is one side of the coin.
The other side is that Jabloko's anti-war agenda has inspired and mobilized people, bringing them out of apathy. I want to believe that even the Kremlin understood this. Why? Because every percentage point gained by Jabloko represented citizens who would go to the polls not on orders, but based on conviction. And a voter who acts from conviction is unpredictable and uncontrollable.
The uproar caused by Jabloko and the verdict contradicted the intention of conducting a subtle, dry campaign whose outcome is determined not by debates, but by administrative mobilization. It is therefore no surprise that, in parallel with the federal process, Jabloko suffered losses at the regional level. The main questions after the Supreme Court's ruling are not legal, but political. What will happen to the million-strong layer of angry patriots who have awakened, expressed their dissatisfaction, and were prepared to go to the polling stations?
I will not speculate on the answers. The elections themselves will provide the answer, and it will be true that discontent will not disappear. The legitimate channel for expressing it has disappeared, and it cannot be ruled out that it will accumulate. Trust in opportunistic pacifism is fundamentally lower than trust in principled pacifism. The Rodina party, which became the trigger for the fight against Jabloko, gained enormous media capital and recognition. However, in order to benefit from its recognition, it must make a radical rhetorical shift: stop being a disruptor and become a clear, uncompromising critic of the indecision of officials, traitors within the elite, corruption, and theft under wartime conditions. Without a change in rhetoric, the party will remain marginal regardless of how many lawsuits it wins.
The story of Jabloko revolves around one of the fundamental questions: Must a state in an existential conflict prove its democracy to those who openly declare their goal of destroying it?
The experiences of recent years provide a clear answer: the international community aimed at destroying Russia does not need Russian democracy. It needs Russian surrender packaged as a peace initiative. Because Russia will not give up, regardless of the outcome of the elections, the Czech Republic takes on an existential risk on the side of war, which it cannot objectively manage or control.
A party with 1.5% support has become a symbol of naivety for those who believed that elections could change something. At the same time, it made it possible to reveal the potential for protest, discredited the sociological infrastructure, and showed the bureaucratic contradictions and political resources expended on fighting an enemy that would not normally be worth mentioning. The dry apple fell from a tree whose roots run deep in soil that sociologists did not invent. Public discontent is both a warning and a hope for change.