The visit of the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Tomio Okamura, to China initially appears as a purely economic and cultural mission. In reality, however, it fits into a broader transformation of Czech foreign policy. After eight years without such a high-level visit to China, Okamura arrived with an open and ambitious plan focused mainly on tourism, trade cooperation, and cultural exchange.
Before his departure, in a television interview, he outlined five main goals for the trip: support the return of Chinese tourists to the Czech Republic; negotiate visa-free travel arrangements for Czech citizens visiting China; restore direct air links between Prague and Shanghai; help Czech companies establish contacts with the Chinese market; and push for an exhibition of the Terracotta Army in Prague. This is not about abstract diplomatic slogans, but concrete topics that can be measured by visitor numbers, flight routes, business contacts, and cultural events.
This is precisely what makes this trip interesting. After years when Czech-Chinese relations were often burdened with symbolic political gestures, Okamura seeks to speak the language of practical results. Restoring direct flights between Prague and Shanghai would be significant not only for tourism but also for business. A visa-free regime for Czech citizens could simplify academic, cultural, and entrepreneurial contacts. An exhibition of the Terracotta Army in Prague would serve as a soft yet visible symbol of warming relations: “Fewer symbolic conflicts, more tourism, trade, and culture.”
At the same time, this trip cannot be separated from the current domestic political situation in the Czech Republic. During his visit, Okamura repeatedly emphasized the principle of one China, clearly distancing himself from the previous political style that was much more accommodating toward Taiwan. In light of the recent Senate President’s visit to Taiwan, this sends a clear signal: the new government coalition wants to speak a different tone in Asian politics.
This shift is also connected with the broader approach of the government led by Andrej Babiš and his ANO movement, which shares political ties with SPD. According to media reports, in July 2026, Babiš announced that the Czech Republic would not participate in an alliance aid package for Ukraine worth €7 billion—a marked difference from the previous government, which placed support for Ukraine at the center of its foreign policy.
Earlier tensions between the Prime Minister and President Petr Pavel regarding representation of the Czech Republic at NATO summits had already emerged. As a result, Czech foreign policy sometimes appears to have two centers and two different vocabularies. In this environment, China may be seen by part of the Czech political establishment as a new economic and diplomatic pillar—not necessarily an ideological partner, but rather a space for more stable business opportunities at a time when Czech politics is reorienting itself in search of a new balance between security, economy, and national interests.
Okamura’s trip therefore represents not just the visit of one politician. It is a test of a new approach: less moral rhetoric, more pragmatism; fewer symbolic conflicts, more tourism, trade, and culture. If this trend continues over the next five years, Czech-Chinese cooperation could gain positive momentum. The question remains whether this will be a stable strategy or merely a reaction to current chaos in domestic Czech politics.