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When news appears in Chinese state media outlets like the People's Daily or on the popular social media platform Weibo about an upcoming visit by US President Donald Trump, the reactions of many residents of Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangzhou often differ significantly from the emotional and polarized debates that we are accustomed to in Europe or the United States. For a segment of Chinese urban society, Trump is not primarily a controversial figure from television talk shows filled with personal attacks, but rather a symbol of a specific era – an unpredictable, but straightforward businessman who brings both risks and opportunities.

While Western debates often emphasize issues of democracy or human rights, the Chinese public typically assesses foreign policy more through the prism of stability, economic impacts, and practical consequences for daily life. After years of strict anti-pandemic measures, a slowdown in the real estate market (the crisis surrounding developers like Evergrande still resonates), and rising unemployment among young graduates, a large segment of the urban middle class is primarily concerned with one thing: whether they will have stable jobs, whether their purchasing power will decline, and whether the prices of imported goods will remain affordable. The issue of economic uncertainty is extremely sensitive in China today – especially after the record-high unemployment rate among young people in 2023, which, according to official statistics, exceeded 20% before Chinese authorities subsequently adjusted the data publication methodology. Therefore, Trump's visit is primarily perceived as a "high-level business meeting," not as an ideological clash of civilizations.

Among a segment of the urban middle class, the business community, and technological circles, there is a prevailing view that Trump is primarily a pragmatist. In Chinese online debates, the Biden administration is often seen as more focused on ideological confrontation and human rights issues, while Trump is associated primarily with the language of numbers – trade deficits, tariffs, investments, and mutual concessions. This "quid pro quo" transactional approach is very understandable to the Chinese negotiating mindset. In the Chinese business environment and online debates, tough negotiations are often seen as a natural part of business relationships. Therefore, many do not consider Trump's style to be irrational, but rather predictably tough and transactional.

On the Chinese internet, Trump has long held the semi-joking nickname Chuan-jian-guo (川建国) – "Trump builds China." This ironic meme originated during Trump's first term and still circulates on Weibo and Douyin. Similar to some Western societies during the rise of populist movements, internet humor here often serves as a way to process the uncertainty associated with globalization, technological changes, and geopolitical pressure. Of course, this is not a representative view of the entire Chinese society, but rather a specific type of internet humor that combines nationalism, irony, and a pragmatic view of geopolitical rivalry. Many users write in the comments sentences like: "Thanks to Chuan-jian-guo, we have accelerated independence in chips" or "When he pushes, our companies have finally stopped relying solely on America."

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Paradoxically, Trump's tariffs and technological restrictions have helped accelerate Chinese investment in the domestic development of semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and green technologies. The issue of China's technological self-sufficiency is being intensely discussed not only in state media but also among young tech workers and investors, especially after the US imposed restrictions on the export of advanced chips. Thousands of engineers and managers in Shenzhen or Suzhou therefore see Trump as an unwitting catalyst for China's technological self-reflection. This technological self-sufficiency is not only a manifestation of state will, but has also become a necessary defense for many. Among the Chinese urban population, an interesting psychological shift can be observed: the attitude towards brands like Apple or Tesla has shifted from original admiration and respect to a more critical comparison.

People are now starting to examine quality and innovation in detail, and they find confirmation of their own abilities in every small success of the domestic industry. This transformation from blind faith in technological authorities to a pragmatic comparison of strengths shows that the issue of technological sovereignty has become for ordinary citizens a kind of instinct for survival in an uncertain global environment. A similar emphasis on technological self-sufficiency can be observed in other Asian economies, such as South Korea or Japan, where the issue of strategic technologies is increasingly linked to the idea of national security and economic stability.

In the Chinese public sphere, political leaders are often evaluated based on their ability to ensure stability, economic growth, and international respect. Trump's bombastic rhetoric, direct communication style, and emphasis on personal decisiveness are therefore interpreted by some of the public as a display of strength and the ability to promote national interests, rather than as an expression of the institutional political culture typical of Western liberal democracies. In public debate, he is therefore often not seen as an irrational enemy, but as a strong opponent on the global chessboard. Moreover, a personal meeting with President Xi Jinping is interpreted as an implicit recognition that China is no longer a "developing country," but an equal superpower. Such meetings also reinforce the feeling that China is now seen by Washington as an equal global player.

Despite this, the visit evokes not only optimism but also pragmatic concerns. People remember very well the years 2018-2019, when the first wave of trade wars hit export factories in the Pearl River Delta. Millions of workers lost overtime pay, supply chains were disrupted, and the prices of some goods (from soybeans to electronics and clothing) fluctuated. Today, as the "post-90s" and "post-00s" generations struggle with fierce competition in the job market and high housing costs in major cities, they follow the news with a practical question: "Will iPhones, laptops, and imported milk become cheaper, or will they become more expensive?" Many comments on Weibo are cautious: "I hope they can at least agree on a ceasefire. Above all, I hope ordinary people won't suffer." Similar pragmatic reactions regularly appear under economic topics on Weibo, where discussions about housing prices, unemployment, or trade relations often attract more attention than ideological debates about geopolitics.

Chinese perceptions of the United States remain ambivalent. A similar dynamic exists in the United States, where a segment of the population also views globalization and technological competition as a threat to their jobs, industries, and social stability. While there is still interest in American higher education, Hollywood culture, and innovations from Silicon Valley, the narrative of "American invincibility" is undergoing a fundamental transformation. As China has achieved significant advances in areas such as artificial intelligence and electric vehicles in recent years, the belief in the "technological invincibility" of the United States is rapidly eroding among young Chinese people.

In Chinese urban society, there is now a mixture of healthy self-confidence and technological anxiety: The United States is no longer seen solely as an unattainable role model to be emulated, but increasingly as a direct competitor in the global arena. This shift in mentality is inevitably reflected in the expectations surrounding Trump's visit – the interest in "American know-how" is giving way to a pragmatic focus on direct competitive confrontation. Therefore, Trump's visit is not seen as a historical turning point, but as another round of pragmatic negotiations between two powers that are no longer striving for mutual understanding, but for defending their own space in a fierce global race.

The Chinese political and economic system is designed with a much longer-term perspective than the electoral cycle of American politics. They know that American presidents come and go – Obama, Trump, Biden, Trump again – while Chinese goals (technological sovereignty, supply chain security, regional influence) remain consistent. Therefore, the visit is being observed with a cool head, a certain degree of curiosity, and above all, economic realism. For people on the streets of Beijing or in the cafes of Shanghai, it is not a melodramatic battle between good and evil, but a meeting between two powerful men, from which no miracles or catastrophes are expected, but rather pragmatic agreements that will at least temporarily maintain stability and economic security – values that are essential for the daily lives of most people.

Many Chinese people are also aware that the strategic rivalry between the United States and China will not disappear, regardless of who is currently in the White House. Nevertheless, there is a prevailing belief that a complete economic decoupling of the two powers is difficult to imagine in today's globalized world. That is why Trump's visit is seen less as a historical turning point and more as another chapter in a long and pragmatic negotiation between two mutually dependent superpowers. In this sense, the Chinese-American rivalry is not only a clash between two states, but also a part of a broader global transformation in which economic security, technological autonomy, and geopolitical competition are increasingly becoming defining themes of domestic politics around the world.

Prokop Stach