saw your photo with Helmut Kohl in your institute's library. Is that at the signing of the Czech-German declaration?

I believe so.

As the Czech Prime Minister, you signed the declaration with the then-German Chancellor in January 1997. Communists, and especially Sládka's Republicans, protested against it. Now, the Sudeten German Homeland Association is holding a conference in Brno, and protests are being planned again. Don't you feel that history is repeating itself?

I would say that it's not a repetition of history. This issue is still with us. Some people try to suppress it, while others bring it to the surface from time to time. I often travel to Germany to speak, and I have to admit that before an event, the organizer often comes to me and says, "Please be prepared, there will be a group that will bring up the Beneš decrees." And I wave my hand and say, "That's a topic I'm familiar with, it doesn't bother me." If someone thinks that this is not a constant, even eternal, issue, then they are fundamentally mistaken.

Shouldn't the Czech-German declaration have been a kind of period, or rather a defined playing field, on which Czech-German relations should take place? Why does the debate about the past keep resurfacing? Is it a Czech-German, Czech-Bavarian, or rather a purely Czech problem?

One thing is that it is a long-standing Czech-German problem, but in this specific case, it is a Czech-Czech problem. Germany has not done anything specific. The current situation was created by the actions of certain politicians and activists in Brno who decided to hold the Sudeten German conference in Brno. This triggered the conflict, which is fundamentally a Czech-Czech issue.

However, it is absolutely clear that it was misleading to argue that this was simply a cultural, ethnographic, or non-political event. That's how Babiš's government initially approached it, downplaying it by saying that it didn't concern us, that it was a private event. They stopped saying that after two events. First, when the Bavarian Prime Minister Söder and the German Interior Minister Dobrindt announced that they wanted to come to Brno. And then, President Pavel put the finishing touch on it all by giving his patronage to this event.

Your institute issued a statement saying that President Pavel's patronage of the Meeting Brno event, which includes the aforementioned conference, threatens Czech-German relations. Aren't you exaggerating the significance of this gesture?

No, this gesture is an unprecedented step. No Czech president since World War II would have made such a gesture. He clearly demonstrated where his thinking is flawed.

I'll come back to President Pavel. I would like to ask about a certain paradox: the most vocal critic of the conference in Brno is Okamura's SPD. At the same time, they are in the same European Parliament faction as the AfD, which occasionally brings up the issue of the Beneš decrees. You yourself have also been to several AfD events. Don't you see a contradiction in that?

I don't see a contradiction in that. It's an artificially created issue. I have been to many AfD events, but I maintain that this topic has never been dominant at AfD. During my participation in AfD congresses or conferences, no one dared to bring up this topic. They say, "We have minorities within our party who play different cards."

By the way, a major ideological conference organized by the AfD will be held next month in the Reichstag building. I will be giving the main or second main speech. And then I will talk to them about it.

Are you talking about Czech-German relations, the Beneš decrees, and their position on them?

Dear Editor, I understand that it is considered appropriate by all parties to use the technical term "Beneš Decrees." However, this is unfair. At the time when the Czechoslovak parliament was not functioning and everything was disrupted by the war, the government simply operated in a manner consistent with the constitutional order of the time, which meant presidential decrees. However, when the parliament convened, it approved these decrees and incorporated them into the Czechoslovak, now Czech, legal system, so they are normal laws of the Czech Republic.

My last question concerns the conference in Brno. For many young Czechs and Germans, the Sudeten German issue is not particularly important; in fact, they tend to see it as a conflict between older generations. Isn't this a natural path to reconciliation?

I reject the word "reconciliation." That is a completely inappropriate word. I am reconciled with the Germans and with Germany, and there is no reason for me to provoke any conflicts with them. And I believe that many rational Germans see it the same way. Those who call for reconciliation are, in essence, calling for a new debate about the results of World War II.

Let's return to President Pavel. Since the formation of the government that emerged from the last elections, we have observed a clear duality in foreign policy. However, this is not entirely new. When you were president, you had significant disagreements with the Špidla and Paroubek governments on foreign policy issues. I remember when Paroubek threatened to cut the presidential office's budget for travel...

You know, I don't even remember that.

Is the situation different now, and in what way?

I see a difference, and it is fundamental. Back then, we never allowed a fundamental conflict to arise between the president and the prime minister. And I say this from both positions I held, as both prime minister and president. But yes, we had different opinions on a whole range of issues. However, I believe that such a conflict or clash never actually occurred.

What about the conflict with the Topolánek government regarding the Lisbon Treaty? You were reluctant to sign it for a long time, and eventually you signed it jointly with the prime minister, you didn't want to sign it alone.

Yes, that was a fundamental conflict. But I would say that it was a conflict of a slightly different order. The then-ruling ODS party essentially knew that the Lisbon Treaty was undesirable and disadvantageous to the Czech Republic. However, they were afraid of upsetting Brussels. But thank you for reminding me, that's fair.

One more trip down memory lane. You attended six NATO summits as president. There was always an agreement between the president and the prime minister. For example, you both attended the very important Bucharest summit in 2008. Now we see a complete lack of agreement on the same issue. How do you perceive this?

First, a note about the Bucharest summit. Its essence was a fatal conflict over whether Ukraine and Georgia should be invited to join NATO. And because no one wanted to address this issue in front of television cameras, it was decided that, in violation of any prepared protocol, there would be a closed-door meeting of the heads of delegations that evening, which I was, not Topolánek. It lasted for many hours. And that's where the real argument broke out. Primarily, Germany opposed the invitation, and I joined in.

But to your question: I would, of course, be in favor of finding a political solution. I consider it completely wrong to refer to the fact that if we don't know how to solve it, we'll hand it over to the Constitutional Court. That's a childish thing that the Presidential Office is doing now, and it also has the greatest power to appoint members to the Constitutional Court.

This problem is the result of a fatal mistake we made when we switched to a direct presidential election. We took this step, but we didn't change the rest of our constitutional system. So, what's happening now is a logical consequence of that populist moment when it suddenly seemed like direct election of everything in the world was a perfect thing. And now we are reaping the fruits of that step.

Going back to the issue of dualism in foreign policy. Your long-time colleague, Petr Macinka, is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Doesn't he also bear some responsibility for this dualism, and isn't he contributing to it?

Let's be fair: Yes, certainly. Everyone has their methods, and Macinka is no exception. However, the President's patronage of the Brno event justifies many of Macinka's positions. I think Macinka couldn't have asked for anything better than for President Pavel to give his patronage, because it allows him to continue his assertive behavior.

If it hadn't been for that major conflict over Filip Turek, Macinka probably wouldn't have even considered becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He would have been a very outspoken Minister of the Environment, and today he would be causing a stir at the Ministry of the Environment.

Speaking of that, do you think that, ultimately, Petr Macinka is a better Minister of Foreign Affairs than Filip Turek would have been?

I would say that we haven't had such a resolute and confident, and internationally sovereign, Minister of Foreign Affairs before.

So, from your perspective, it turned out better?

That's another question. I agreed with Macinka that he should choose the Ministry of the Environment from the beginning, because he believes that it is a crucial ministry for our time. Because that's where the fundamental struggle for the very character of our world is taking place.

It reminded me a bit of Michel Houellebecq's book Submission, where a moderate Islamist becomes president in France in the elections. And then, when it comes to forming the government, he says, "We only need the Ministry of Education." Because it is the most important for transforming society. Macinka initially saw the Ministry of the Environment in a similar way, as the key ministry for our time.

Petr Macinka has brought several people into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in various positions who are associated with your institute. Do you now have influence on today's Czech foreign policy?

No, I certainly don't have any influence. Petr Macinka is such a self-confident minister that he continues in the spirit that I expressed in a joke from the 1990s: "Do you know why Klaus has advisors? So he has someone to advise him." And now, someone is even coming to ask us about it. (Jiří Weigl, long-time director of the Václav Klaus Institute and recently also Macinka's external advisor, enters the room - pozn.red.). "Jiří, I'm just getting asked whether, by the participation of some people from our institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I now have influence on Czech foreign policy."

Jiří Weigl: "The President has an influence on foreign policy, but not an immediate influence, rather a long-term one, because people who have worked closely with him are influenced by his views and approaches. It is precisely this school of thought that allows Minister Macinka to successfully perform his function. But he doesn't have influence on specific questions."

Finally, I'll ask about what is probably the most important foreign policy event in our region, which were the Hungarian parliamentary elections. You have often been a guest at events organized by Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán. Is this really a fundamental change for Central Europe?

You asked, not knowing that this question is related to the previous one. The people who occasionally advise the minister have very different opinions about the new Hungarian Prime Minister than I do. While I am despairing and think only negative things about him, these gentlemen tell me that Péter Magyar was once in Fidesz, that he is not ideologically a radical, and that he is not where the Czech ANO party is. To that, I reply that Petr Fiala was also once in the ODS party, and then where did he lead the party? We had several debates on this topic. Isn't that right, Jirko? (Jiří Weigl nods).

Veselin Vačkov, PrahaIN, May 22, 2026

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