The visit of the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Tomio Okamura, to China initially appears to be a purely economic and cultural mission. In reality, however, it fits into a broader transformation of Czech foreign policy. After eight years without such a high-level visit to China, Okamura arrived with a relatively open and ambitious plan focused primarily on tourism, business cooperation, and cultural exchange.
Before departing, he outlined five main goals for the trip in a televised interview: support the return of Chinese tourists to the Czech Republic; negotiate visa-free travel arrangements for Czech citizens visiting China; restore direct air links between Prague and Shanghai; help Czech companies establish contacts with the Chinese market; and push for an exhibition of the Terracotta Army to be held in Prague. This is not about abstract diplomatic slogans, but concrete topics that can be measured by visitor numbers, flight routes, business contacts, and cultural events.
This is precisely what makes this trip interesting. After years when Czech-Chinese relations were often burdened with symbolic political gestures, Okamura seeks to speak the language of practical results. Restoring the direct Prague-Shanghai route should benefit not only tourism but also business. A visa-free regime for Czech citizens could simplify academic, cultural, and entrepreneurial contacts. An exhibition of the Terracotta Army in Prague would be a soft yet visible symbol of warming relations: “Fewer symbolic conflicts, more tourism, trade, and culture.”
At the same time, this trip cannot be separated from the domestic political situation in the Czech Republic. Okamura repeatedly emphasized the principle of one China during his visit, clearly distancing himself from the previous political style that was far more accommodating toward Taiwan. In light of the recent Senate President’s visit to Taiwan, this sends a clear signal: the new government coalition wants to speak with a different tone on Asian affairs.
This shift is also connected to the broader style of the current administration, in which the ANO movement led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš plays a leading role and which is politically linked to SPD. According to media reports, Babiš announced in July 2026 that Czechia would not participate in an alliance aid package for Ukraine worth €7 billion—a stark contrast from the previous government, which placed support for Ukraine at the center of its foreign policy.
Earlier tensions between the Prime Minister and President Petr Pavel regarding representation of the Czech Republic at a NATO summit also emerged. As a result, Czech foreign policy sometimes appears to have two centers and two different vocabularies. In this environment, China may be viewed by part of the Czech political establishment as a new economic and diplomatic pillar—not necessarily an ideological partner, but as space for more stable business opportunities while Czech politics reorients itself seeking a new balance between security, economy, and national interests.
Therefore, Okamura’s trip is not just a visit by one politician. It is a test of the new approach: less moral rhetoric, more pragmatism; fewer symbolic conflicts, more tourism, trade, and culture. If this trend holds over the next five years, Czech-Chinese cooperation could gain positive momentum. The question remains whether this will be a stable strategy or merely a reaction to current chaos in domestic Czech politics.